

# Conceptual Spaces, The Unified Conceptual Space Theory, and Metaphor

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US

University of Sussex  
Informatics

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# Outline

- 1 My Research
  - Motivations
  - Main Contributions
  - A Few Key Points
- 2 Conceptual Spaces Theory
  - Gärdenfors' Account
  - Unified Conceptual Space Theory
- 3 Conceptual Spaces and Metaphor
  - Core Ideas
  - Developing These Ideas
  - Unified Conceptual Space Theory and Metaphor

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- Address a fundamental shortcoming in cognitive science research .




*“For reasons I’ll try to make clear, the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts. And I think that the theory of concepts that cognitive science has classically assumed is in a certain way seriously mistaken.”*

- Explicate the relationship between concepts and language and show how the two pull apart.
- Provide philosophical support for previous work I have done in AI and work I hope to do in future.

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


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# Main Contributions

- Demonstrates how most contemporary debates over theories of concepts divide over whether concepts are best understood as mental representations or as non-representational abilities.
- Concludes that there can be no single correct ontology, and that both perspectives are logically necessary.
- Details three critical distinctions that are frequently neglected:
  - Between concepts as we possess and employ them non-reflectively and concepts as we reflect upon them.
  - Between the private (subjective) and public (inter-subjective) aspects of concepts.
  - Between concepts as approached from a realist versus anti-realist perspective.

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  - Their essential nature.
  - Core (and extrinsic) properties.
  - Context of application.
- Done within the framework of Gärdenfors' conceptual spaces theory of concepts (CST):
  - Offered as a bridging account, best able to tie existing theories together into one framework.
  - Set of extensions offered (Unified Conceptual Space Theory or UCST) as means of pushing Gärdenfors' theory in a more algorithmically amenable and empirically testable direction.

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- ...How an analogous process happens at the societal level.
- CST and UCST put to work offering a distinctive account of the co-emergence of concepts and experience.
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# Concepts

- Roughly, individuable units of structured knowledge that meet Evans' Generality Constraint.
- Partly constituted by beliefs.
- Allow agent to step back from strict experience-in-the-moment to take a wider view.
- Can usefully be categorized into first-order (possessed by all conceptual agents) and higher-order (possessed by some).
- Can usefully be classified as well by the sorts of things they reference: i.e., object concepts - action concepts - property concepts.



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# Concepts and Representations



*"The gun I reach for when I hear the word representation has this engraved on it:  
'When P is used by Q to represent R to S,  
who is Q and who is S?"*

- Require *active* intentionality: agency.
- Not ontological reals but a perspective, one that, as reflectively capable agents, we can't set aside.
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# Concepts and Language

- Anathema to Davidson, Sellars (early if not late), McDowell.
- Central to Merlin Donald's account of cognitive-cultural evolution.
- Article of faith to “animal concepts” people, whose criteria for attributing concepts are:
  - Evidence of an ability to derive general classes from specific instances.
  - Demonstration of a flexible pattern of behaviour based on this ability, especially when confronted with novel situations.
  - Demonstration of surprise upon making a mistake (Newen and Bartels 2007, Allen 1999).

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## Basic Principles

- Neither associationist nor symbolic accounts of cognition, on their own, are adequate to addressing the nature of concepts.
- Just as accounting for cognition in terms of concepts bridges different levels of cognition, so, too, do concepts themselves.
- “There is no unique correct way of describing cognition” (Gärdenfors, 2004) – and no unique correct perspective on concepts.
- No unique correct perspective on any particular concept, either, not least because concepts *change*.

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## Basic Premises

- Similarity-space-based theory of concepts, where concepts are described in the neutral language of geometry.
- Concepts exist within *conceptual spaces* either as points within those spaces or as generally convex shapes.
- An agent has a different conceptual space for each possible domain.
- The process of carving up a particular conceptual space into various possible shapes is the process of *categorization*.



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
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
## Shortcomings



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
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
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## Peter's Vision

### The full monty ...



## Local and Distal Connections

- Concepts, as before, are well-behaved sub-regions. They can be collapsed to points. Points can be expanded to sub-regions.
- All points within the Unified Conceptual Space have a certain logical relationship to all contiguous points in that space.
- Two kinds of distal connections:
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# Unified Conceptual Space

- Describable along three dimensions:
  - **axis of generality**: from maximally specific to maximally general
  - no class/instance distinction: any instance can, within practical limits, be treated as a class
  - **axis of abstraction**: from maximally concrete/physical to maximally abstract/mental
  - mental and physical are two directions along a continuum
  - **axis of alternatives**: from maximally similar, to maximally different
  - arrived at by adjusting the values of any of the concept's integral dimensions



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## The Building Blocks

- object concepts
- action/event concepts
- property concepts
- (logical connectors - "glue")
- components (similar-type sub-parts)
- parameters (integral dimensions)
- contextuials (associated)

Only object concepts and action/event concepts have components.

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# Core Hypothesis

*“The core hypothesis here is that a metaphor expresses an identity in topological or geometrical structure between different domains. A word that represents a particular structure in one domain can be used as a metaphor to express the same structure in another domain.... In this way one can account for how a metaphor can transfer information about one conceptual domain to another.”*

*“A metaphor does not come alone – it is not only a comparison between two single concepts but it also involves an identification of the structure of two complete domains.”*

“the peak of his career”

- vertically highest point in e.g. a mountain
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# The Peak of His Career



# Finding Metaphor

- Metaphors often used to make the abstract concrete.
- Argue in my thesis for a kind of perspective dualism: “physical” and “mental” are rough areas along a continuum between zeroth- and higher-order concepts.
- Physical objects and actions/events are paradigmatically things experienced through our sensorimotor engagements with them.
- Abstract/mental objects and action/events are often (not always) couched in metaphorically sensorimotor-based terms: “*fueling* the frenzy of the crowd” (pouring fuel onto) or “*cultivating* hope” (planting, watering, etc.).
- Similar to Gärdenfors’ notion that we find typically metaphors between ontogenetically “basic domains” and ones we acquire later on.

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# Metaphorical Death

- Sometimes the mapping between primary domain and target domain gets absorbed into the target domain.
- Or: sometimes the secondary meaning becomes primary.

## *haven*

- In (American) English, used to mean a harbor, with a metaphorical meaning of “place of refuge”.
  - Now, the metaphorical meaning is primary and the the “old” meaning all but forgotten.
  - Still retains the meaning of “harbor” in the Scandanavian languages: *hamn* in Swedish, *havn* (I think) in Danish. But *föra något i hamn* - “guide something into harbour” = “bring something to a successful conclusion”.



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## Litera and Metaphors

- Metaphor arises any time one applies a concept outside its primary domain of application.
- But no two domains of application are ever *exactly* the same, so...
- The idea of a “primary domain of application” is a conceptual abstraction.
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- Conclusion: No sharp distinction between literal meaning and metaphor: all meaning is in a sense metaphorical.

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# Meaning Making and Metaphor

- Metaphor primarily a semantic not a linguistic issue: you have to get the concepts right to get the language right.
- Concepts inseparably involve syntax and semantics.
- *All* meaning making involves a mapping of disjoint and often contrasting conceptual spaces onto one another.
  - Mis-matching dimensions ignored in favour of dimensions that *do* match.
  - Always takes place relative to a *contrast class*, which provides the context.
  - This makes metaphorical meaning highly context sensitive.
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- Application of unexpected property: *pink elephant* (but also *black swan!*).
- Sometimes these become conventionalized expressions.
- Introduction of unexpected contextual: *pigs fly*, *mountains whisper*.
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## Relation of Metaphor to . . .

- Strict identity: The mapping for primary to target domain is exact.
- Concept combination: Novel mappings. Fodor's infamous "pet fish".
- Metonymy: Mapping of part to whole or whole to part.

*"The main metonymic operations are **pars pro toto**, where a part represents a whole as in 'there are twenty heads in the class room', and **toto pro pars**, where a whole represents a part as in 'Paris announces shorter skirts.'"*

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# Outline

- 1 My Research
  - Motivations
  - Main Contributions
  - A Few Key Points
- 2 Conceptual Spaces Theory
  - Gärdenfors' Account
  - Unified Conceptual Space Theory
- 3 **Conceptual Spaces and Metaphor**
  - Core Ideas
  - Developing These Ideas
  - **Unified Conceptual Space Theory and Metaphor**

# UCST and Metaphor

- Provides mechanism by which different domains get mapped together.
- Provides detail of different kinds of mapping:
  - Between object and object, action/event and action/event, property and property.
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## Toy Application

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- Similar to Gärdenfors’ idea (2004a) of an updated “semantic web” application that, rather than searching “intelligently” for key words and phrases, helps the user generate her own externalized conceptual spaces.
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
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# Opening Screen





# Conclusions

- CST and UCST provide one way of moving beyond the rigidity of many “purely” symbolic accounts and reasoning with uncertainty. (ATT-Meta is, of course, another.)
- CST provides a formalized way to talk about similarity that does not run afoul of Goodman’s well-known objections to similarity.
- CST and UCST have only fairly preliminary things to say about metaphor and much less to say about metonymy.
- Their main contribution in this area is talking about and providing a mechanism for how domains get mapped onto one another in a way that is, sometimes, understood to be metaphorical.

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